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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.

:

JUAN JOSE LOPEZ, JR.,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 890324-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions of second degree
murder, a first degree felony; and child abuse, a second degree
felony.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under

Utah Code Ann. S 78-3a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989) based upon the order
of the Utah Supreme Court transferring jurisdiction on May 19,
1989.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Was defendant entitled to severance of the two

offenses that occurred at the same time and were incident to a
single criminal objective where the evidence of the second
offense was intertwined with the evidence of the first offense?
2.

Was it error for the trial court to refuse to give

defendant's additional instruction on manslaughter when the jury
was correctly instructed on manslaughter?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-402 (1978)t
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a
single criminal action for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode . . . .
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-401 (1978)t
In this part unless the context requires a
different definitionf "single criminal
episode" means all conduct which is closely
related in time and is incident to an attempt
or an accomplishment of a single crimial
objective.
Nothing in this part shall be construed to
limit or modify the effect of section 77-2131 in controlling the joinder of offenses and
defendants in criminal proceedings.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-9 (1978)t
(a)Two or more offenses may be charged in the
same indictment or information in a separate
count for each offense if the offenses
charged arise out of a criminal episode as
defined in section 76-1-401.

(d) If it appears that a defendant or the
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses . . . in an indictment or
information, . . . the court shall order an
election of separate trials of separate
counts, . . . or provide such other relief as
justice requires.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with second degree murder,
a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-203
(Supp. 1989), and child abuse a second degree felony in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2) (Supp. 1989).

A jury found

defendant guilty of both charges on November 28, 1988. Judge

John A. Rokich sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of five
years to life for second degree murder and one to fifteen years
for child abuse.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the early morning hours of March 2, 1988 defendant
stabbed his girlfriend, Cindy Hernandez, to death with an eight
inch kitchen knife while her seven year old son, Roberto, watched
(T. 72-4, 133, 147, 263). After stabbing Ms. Hernandez,
defendant rifled through her purse (T. 74-5).

When Roberto asked

defendant if his mother was allright, defendant began choking him
until he passed out (T. 77-8).

Defendant told Roberto if he told

anyone, defendant would kill him (T. 78). Defendant fled the
State, and was eventually arrested in Burley, Idaho (T. 177).
Defendant lived in Ms. Hernandez' home with her and her
three children (T. 62-4, 85). On the evening before the
homicide, Ms. Hernandez left the home and went to a bar (T. 63,
88-9).

Later, defendant left the children alone while he went to

look for Ms. Hernandez (T. 31-2, 65, 273). Defendant returned
home alone much later (T. 69, 76-7).

After defendant returned

home, three or four people came to visit him and purchased drugs
from him (T. 70, 243, 78, 307-08).

They went into the bathroom

and used the drugs (T. 98-9, 307-08).
Ms. Hernandez returned home while defendant's friends
were there (T. 70, 245, 281). A white male, who stayed outside
the door, arrived with her (T. 245, 281). Ms. Hernandez said she
did not want defendant's friends in her house, told them to leave
and started to call the police (T. 70-1, 102-3, 246-7).

-*-

(Her

attempt to call someone is corroborated by the fact that the
telephone was off the hook near her body the next morning (ex. 4S, ex. 9-S)).

All but one of the people in the apartment,

defendant's friend Chito, did leave immediately (T. 70-1, 246-7,
309).
Defendant and Ms. Hernandez began fighting and
defendant threw her against the wall (T. 71). Defendant came out
of the kitchen with a knife and pushed Ms. Hernandez into some
pottery (T. 72-3).

Defendant raised the knife above his head and

"made it go down fast" into Roberto's mother while Roberto
watched (T. 73-4).

Roberto said that Chito stayed in the hallway

while defendant hit and stabbed his mother (T. 107). Chito hit
his mother after defendant stabbed her (T. 108). Roberto went
into his own room and heard a lot of screaming before it finally
became quiet (T. 74).
There were six cuts on Ms. Hernandez' body all together
(T. 139) along with several blunt trauma injuries (T. 140-42).
Three of the stab wounds were potentially life threatening (T.
144).

The most serious of these entered the right side of her

neck, severed the food pipe, the left carotid artery, the left
subclavian artery and continued through the left lung into the
inner surface of the back side of the chest cavity (T. 1312,144).

A second wound cut the fourth and fifth right ribs, into

the lung, through the diaphragm, into the liver, back through the
diaphragm and nicked the lung again (T. 135-36).

A third entered

the right shoulder, through the arm, into the chest cavity
without exiting the armpit, between the third and fourth ribs and
into the lung (T. 137).
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After the screaming stopped, Roberto came to the door
of his bedroom and asked defendant if his mother was allright (T.
76).

Defendant told Roberto that he should go to bed, that his

mother was allright, and that she was just sleeping (T. 76).
Roberto asked defendant why he had blood all over him and
defendant told Roberto that he beat up "the guy who wouldn't
leave" (T. 76). Roberto kept insisting he wanted to see his
mother and defendant began choking Roberto, first with his hands,
and then with a vacuum cleaner cord (T. 77). It hurt and Roberto
held his breath to keep from passing out (T. 77-8, 82). When
defendant stopped strangling Roberto, he said if Roberto told
anyone, he would kill him (T. 78).
The ligature caused extreme petechial hemmorhages over
Roberto's skin and in the white of his eye (T. 151-2, 154, ex.
12-S, 13-S, 14-S, 15-S, 16-S).

Petechia is caused when blood

vessels burst because the high pressure blood continues to pump
into the head but a ligature blocks the flow of low pressure
blood out of the head (T. 151-2).

This was a particularly

impressive example of petechia, seen normally on dead persons,
which was potentially life-threatening (T. 153-4).
Chito told defendant to wash the knife and put it back
(T. 110).

Defendant cpvered Ms. Hernandez with a blanket after

tying her hands together with a cord (T. 51-3, 142-3, 289).
Chito left the apartment at least 10 minutes after the others
(246-7).

Defendant fled and was arrested on March 14, 1988 in

Burley, I<Jaho (T. 177).

After he was arrested, defendant told police officers
three different stories about the stabbing.

First, defendant

denied involvement completely, claiming that he left the
apartment before Ms. Hernandez returned that evening and went to
Evanston (T. 184). He said he believed Chito was responsible for
her death.
Next, defendant said that they fought because Ms.
Hernandez said that the unidentified white man was her new
boyfriend (T. 187-88).

Ms. Hernandez tried to stab him but

missed and stabbed herself (T. 189). With the knife in her
chest, Ms. Hernandez talked with defendant for one and one-half
to two hours while defendant begged her to go to the hospital (T.
190).

She begged him to end it for her and he eventually gave in

and stabbed her twice more (T. 190). Defendant said he panicked
and began choking Roberto when Roberto began screaming and crying
(T. 191-2).

He thought Roberto was dead, but he was not sure (T.

192).
At trial, defendant said that he lied to the officers
because they were rude to him (T. 298-99, 303). He testified
that he could not remember stabbing Ms. Hernandez but explained
that he did it because he was upset when she brought home a new
boyfriend and because she called him a "mother-fucker" and told
him to get out of the apartment (T. 281-87).

He said he had been

upset earlier in the evening beause she seemed to be shirking her
duties as a mother and leaving the care of her children to him
(T. 273-75).

He said he could not remember choking Roberto or

tying Ms. Hernandez' hands (T. 89, 302-03).
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After the stabbing, defendant testified that he went to
his father's home with bllod all over him (T. 289). When his
father saw him and defendant would not say what happened,
defendant said his father tied him up and took him back to the
apartment where they saw the body (T. 290-91).

His father wanted

him to leave the country and they drove to Reno (T. 291-92).
Defendant put his father on a plane to Mexico and drove himself
to Wendover and then to Burley, Idaho where he was arrested (T.
293-4).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant was not entitled to severance of the charges
because they were part of a single criminal episode and defendant
was not unfairly prejudiced by the joinder.

The evidence of both

charges was inextricably intertwined and the evidence of
defendant choking Roberto was relevant to his state of mind at
the time of the murder.
The prosecutor did misstate the law on the definition
of manslaughter, however, defense counsel clarified the mistake
at the time and the jury was correctly instructed on the elements
of manslaughter.

Thus, defendant was not prejudiced by the trial

court's refusal to give an instruction that merely restated the
definition of extreme emotional disturbance already contained in
the instructions given to the jury.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SEVERANCE OF
THE CHARGES.
Prior to trial, defendant moved to sever the child
abuse charge from the second degree murder charge asserting that
they were not part of a single criminal episode and that he was
prejudiced by the joinder.

Judge Rokich denied the motion and

both counts were tried together.
There is no question that two charges arising from a
single criminal episode can be tried together absent prejudice to
the prosecution or defense.
35-9 (1978 and 1982).

Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-402 and 77-

In fact, the State must charge multiple

offenses that are part of a single criminal episode together or
be forever barred from prosecuting the defendant for the charges
arising from the same episode.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-403 (1978).

Denial of a motion to sever separate counts of a single
information will be reversed only where the trial court abused
its discretion.

State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985).

Thus, the trial court's decision in this case should be affirmed
unless the court abused its discretion in determining that the
acts were part of a single criminal episode and that defendant
was not prejudiced by their joinder.
Defendant's first contention, that these crimes were
not part of a single criminal episode is meritless.

Utah Code

Ann. § 76-1-401 (1982) defines a single criminal episode as
-conduct that is closely related in time and is incident to an
attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective."
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These two crimes are not only close in time, they are virtually
inseparable.

Defendant choked Roberto because Roberto witnessed

the stabbing of his mother just moments before and kept insisting
that he see if his mother was allright.
Defendant's assertion that the acts are "not
necessarily closely related in time" is absurd.

The evidence

reveals that the child abuse followed the homicide almost
immediately.

The acts were not separated by as much as one day

or the time it takes to drive 65 miles such as were the acts
discussed in State v. Bair# 671 P.2d 203, 206 (Utah 1983).

There

is no question that the two crimes here were also closely related
in time.

Burglaries that were separated by the time it took for

a defendant to move from a laundry room to an apartment in the
same building were found to be close enough in time to be a
single criminal episode.

State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah

1985).
Furthermore, these crimes arose from a single criminal
objective.

That objective was to kill Cindy Hernandez and to

cover up the crime by making it appear that she was killed by
someone who was robbing her and to cover up the murder further by
eliminating the eye witness.
While State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977),
superficially appears to support defendant's position, it is
distinguishable.

The Court there did not want to inextricably

entangle crimes committed at later times to avoid apprehension
for earlier crimes as always being part of a single episode.
Court did not, however, state that they are never part of a
single criminal episode and should never be joined.

The

In Cornishf the two crimes that the prosecutor wished
to join were vehicle theft and failure to stop when the police
officer spotted Cornish the next day.

These crimes were not

close in time and were not necessarily related but only
fortuitously so.

If the officer had not spotted Cornish, the

second crime would not have been committed and was only
incidentally the result of the previous crime.

Defendant urges a

very broad reading of Cornish upon this Court in claiming that
there was not a single criminal objective in this case. Defendant
reads Cornish to say that crimes committed to avoid detection of
another crime# even those committed nearly simultaneously with
the first crime, are never part of a single criminal episode.

On

the contrary, all that Cornish says is that the crimes in that
particular case were not part of a single criminal episode.

The

crimes in this case were, however, part of a single episode and
were properly joined.
The final aspect of this issue is whether defendant was
prejudiced by joinder of the offenses.

Because a defendant is

always prejudiced by the State's evidence in the sense that it
tends to prove his guilt, the question is actually whether
defendant was unfairly prejudiced by joinder of the child abuse
charge.

C£. State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah 1989)

(evidence that tends to prove element of crime admissible unless
unfairly prejudicial).

Defendant was not unfairly prejudiced by

joinder of the two offenses because the child abuse was relevant
to show defendant's state of mind at the time of the homicide.

Even if the State had not joined the two charges, the
evidence would have been admissible under Utah R. Evid. 404(b)
(1989), to show intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake or
accident.

Jamison, 767 P.2d at 137. The evidence was very

probative of these factors where defendant claimed that he did
not intend to kill Ms. Hernandez and did not recall the homicide
because he was so upset at the time of the stabbing.

One of the

most highly probative aspects of Roberto's testimony was that
while defendant was choking him, defendant stated that if Roberto
told anyone what had happened, defendant would kill him.

This

evidence could not have been presented without also establishing
the child abuse.

Because M[i]ntent is an element that often can

be proved only by means of circumstantial proof,"

State v.

Valdez, 748 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1987) (citation omitted), the State
needed Roberto's testimony to aid in establishing defendant's
intent.

Thus, defendant was not unfairly prejudiced by joinder

because the State would have introduced the evidence of child
abuse in any event.
Because the State would have attempted to introduce the
evidence under Rule 404(b) if the charges were severed, the
balancing of probativeness against prejudicial effect was
relevant to Judge Rokich's determination.

Although the Judge did

not articulate this clearly, it is logical that he would consider
the harmlessness of the joinder where the evidence would be
admissible in any event.

No doubt, Judge Rokich was simply

thinking about whether he would likely admit the evidence under
404(b) when he indicated his inclination to weigh the pobative

value against the prejudicial effect.

Consequently, even though

probativeness versus unfair prejudice balancing is not expressly
a part of the § 77-35-9 severance determination, it was a factor
that the Judge needed to consider in determining the question of
whether defendant would suffer unfair prejudice from joinder in
this case and it was not error for Judge Rokich to engage in the
balancing test.

See State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah

1987) (severance of charge did not make it inadmissible in trial
of other charge if admissible under Rule 404(b)).
Although the fact that defendant choked Roberto is
probative of his mental state at the time he killed Ms.
Hernandez, defendant claims that it was irrelevant to the second
degree murder charge.

He relies on State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d

1214 (Utah 1985)/ for the proposition that events occurring after
a homicide are not to be considered in establishing the mens rea
for the homicide.

Bolsinger does not stand for this proposition.

The language quoted by defendant does not state such a rule.
All the court in Bolsinger indicated was that other evidence of
intent to kill in that case was so lacking, that the evidence
that defendant afterward stole a stereo from the decedent did not

Defendant quotes the following passage:
The jury may well have been swayed by the
reprehensible conduct of the defendant
subsequent to her death. But that conduct is
not before us for review. The evidence is
undisputed that [the victim] was dead when
defendant arose from the bed. He himself
covered her face with a sheet, a universal
gesture acknowledging death. At that moment
the conduct which subjected him to a charge
of criminal homicide came to an end.
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persuade the court that there was sufficient evidence of intent
to kill.
In fact# if defendant's misstatement of the law were
the rule, then defendant's testimony that he kissed Ms. Hernandez
on the cheek and closed her eyes after he stabbed her was also
irrelevant to his mental state at the time of the homicide. As
was his testimony about how his father tied him up and returned
him to the apartment to determine what had occurred because
defendant was nonresponsive to his father's inquiries.

Surely

defendant does not suggest that he should have been precluded
from presenting such testimony.
A rule that acts committed after a homicide are
irrelevant to the crime would be inconsistent with the holdings
in other cases that certain activities of a defendant after a
crime are relevant to the crime.

For example, flight after a

crime can be used by a jury to infer that a defendant is guilty
of the crime charged.
1983).

See State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah

Also, a defendant's confession or inconsistent

statements made after the crime are relevant to prove the crime,
Utah R. Evid. 801; his possession of recently stolen property may
be used by the jury to infer that he stole the property,

Utah

Code Ann. S 76-6-402(1) (1978); State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232
(Utah 1986); and his alteration of the appearance of a stolen
vehicle corroborates the charge that he stole it, State v.
Clayton, 658 P.2d 621 (Utah 1983).

Evidently, defendant's acts

occurring after a crime are not per se irrelevant to the crime.

-i *.

Defendant acknowledges in his brief that the jury might
have used the strangling of Roberto to infer that defendant
intended to kill Ms. Hernandez.
was improper.

He claims, however, that this

Defendant's argument on this point is weak.

Certainly the jury would have had less evidence from which to
infer intent without Roberto's testimony of the abuse, but that
fact supports the State's desire to use the evidence rather than
defendant's desire to exclude it.

Agreeably, defendant was

prejudiced by the evidence, but he was not unfairly prejudiced by
it.
Defendant also asserts that doubts about prejudice from
joinder of offenses should be resolved in favor of the defendant.
The cases he cites, however, do not stand for this proposition.
State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 356 (Utah 1980) states nothing
of the sort.

State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 444-45 (Utah 1986),

stands for the rule that doubts about severance of defendants
should be resolved in favor of the defendants rather than the
State.

There is no indication that such a rule is applicable to

severance of counts in an information that are properly joined as
part of a single criminal episode.

Indeed, joinder is wholly

within the discretion of the trial court and that discretion will
not be overturned lightly.

State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 740

(Utah 1985).
Because the evidence was admissible even if the counts
had been severed, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that defendant was not unfairly prejudiced by joinder.
Judge Rokich's ruling should, therefore, be affirmed.
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POINT II
DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY CLAIM THAT THE JURY
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN A CURATIVE INSTRUCTION
ON THE PROSECUTOR'S MISSTATEMENT OF THE LAW
AND THE JURY WAS# IN ANY EVENT, PROPERLY
INSTRUCTED.
Defendant complains that the prosecutor misstated the
law of manslaughter when he told the jury that a reasonable man
would not have killed Ms. Hernandez.

He links his motion for a

mistrial based upon this misstatement with his earlier request
for an additional paragraph in the manslaughter instruction that
explained that the killing need not be reasonable, only the
extreme emotional disturbance need be reasonable, and urges
reversal of his conviction of manslaughter.
Defendant's argument amounts to a request for the first
time on appeal that the jury be given a curative instruction on
the correct law of manslaughter.

A request that was waived by

his failure to make it at trial.

State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290,

1292 (Utah 1982).

When defense counsel objected to the

prosecutor's misstatement, she herself gave a correct statement
of the law and the court agreed with her.

She did not request at

that time that the court give a further curative instruction.
Later, she stated for the record her earlier objection
to the failure to give the jury instruction that had been
requested prior to closing arguments when the jury instructions
were initially developed.

She separately requested a mistrial

based only upon the prosecutor's misstatement of the law but did
not request that the court give a curative instruction.
she stopped with the request for a mistrial.

Instead,

She did not say

that her explanation of the correct law was insufficient to
apprise the jury of the prosecutor's mistake but, instead,
claimed that the mistake was so egregious, the fact that it
occurred should result in a mistrial.

In these circumstances,

defendant cannot argue that he requested a curative jury
instruction that the trial court improperly denied.
Most important is that the jury, nevertheless, heard a
correct statement of the law of manslaughter and were given
written instructions that correctly stated the law.

The trial

court read these instructions to the jury before closing
arguments and defense counsel interjected the correct law at the
time of the misstatement.

Thus, defendant cannot complain that

the jury was not fully apprised of the prosecutor's error and of
the correct law.
Even if this Court considers defendant's claims
separately as an erroneous denial of a jury instruction and an
erroneous denial of a mistrial, his conviction should be
affirmed.

Considering first the issue of the jury instruction,

the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction
even though it was an accurate statement of the law because the
jury was properly and sufficiently instructed on the law of
manslaughter.

Jury Instruction 23 describing the elements of

manslaughter reads, in pertinent parts
2. That Juan Jose Lopez, Jr., caused said
death under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance for which there is a
reasonable explanation or excuse.
(R. 124). Jury Instruction 28 further states, in pertinent part:
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In determining whether or not the defendant
acted under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance, you should consider
all of the circumstances surrounding the
death of Cindy Hernandez. If you find that
the defendant, JUAN LOPEZ, caused the death
of Cindy Hernandez while under the influence
of extreme emotional disturbance, you must
next determine whether or not there was a
reasonable explanation for such disturbance.
The reasonableness of the explanation or
excuse for the extreme emotional disturbance
is to be determined from the viewpoint of a
reasonable person under the then existing
circumstances.
(R. 129). These instructions make it clear that it is the
extreme emotional disturbance that must be reasonable and not the
killing.

The manslaughter statute provides that
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes
manslaughter if the actor:
(b) causes the death of another under the
influence of extreme emotional disturbance
for which there is a reasonable explanation
or excuse . . .

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (Supp. 1989).

The paragraph defendant

wanted to include was accurate, but it was unnecessary because
the instructions given were also an accurate reflection of the
law.

There is no error in refusing to give instructions that are

merely repetitive of principles adequately explained in other
instructions.

State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Utah 1984).

Normally, instructions worded in the statutory language are
considered to be correct and sufficient.
P.2d 903, 907 (Utah 1982).

State v. Maestas, 652

In fact, the jury in State v. Bishop,

652 P.2d 439, 468 (Utah 1988), was instructed with nearly
identical language.

The Supreme Court held that this language

did not require the jury to find that the killings were
reasonable and refused to reverse Bishop's conviction on this
basis.

Because the jury was accurately instructed on

manslaughter, it was not reversible error for the trial court to
refuse to give defendant's requested additional instruction.
The second aspect of defendants claim is that the
prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he stated in closing
argument:

M

. . . would a reasonable man that night have stabbed

Cindy Hernandez to death? . . . But a reasonable man would not
kill Cindy Hernandez because she had another boyfriend."

The

prosecutor did misstate the law in these comments to the jury,
however, defendant was not prejudiced by the misstatements
because defense counsel correctly stated the law in her immediate
objection and because the jury was properly instructed on the
definition of manslaughter.
So, even though it was misconduct for the prosecutor to
misstate the law, this Court should not reverse defendant's
conviction because the jurors were probably not influenced by the
remarks.

See State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984).

It

is unlikely that defendant would have received a more favorable
result even if the prosecutor had not made the inaccurate remarks
and confidence in the verdict is not undermined, see State v.
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988), because there was
overwhelming evidence of intent along with evidence making
defendant's theory incredible.

For these reasons, Judge Rokich

did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.
State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 527 P.2d 1322 (1974) (court will
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reverse denial of motion for mistrial only where is was clear
abuse of discretion).
Defendant sold drugs to his friends in Ms. Hernandez'
apartment on the night of her death.

When Ms. Hernandez came

home and demanded that his customers leave and attempted to call
the police, defendant became angry and began pushing her around.
Defendant retrieved the knife from the kitchen and then used it
on Ms. Hernandez.

Immediately after stabbing Ms. Hernandez to

death, defendant began rifling through her purse.

He tried to

cover up the murder by strangling her son with his hands and with
a vacuum cleaner cord after Roberto asked about his mother's
well-being and noted the blood on defendant's clothing.
Defendant told Roberto he would kill him if Roberto told anyone
what had happened.
Defendant's theory that he suffered from an extreme
emotional disturbance is implausible.

He admitted to selling

drugs that night and asserted that he never sold drugs in bars,
only in his home.

He said that he was disturbed by Ms. Hernandez

selling drugs in bars.

Every witness who was there that night

testified that Ms. Hernandez was angry when she came home and
found defendant's customers there.

Roberto said that she started

to call the police and his story is corroborated by the fact that
the telephone was off the hook on the floor near the body.

Thus,

the evidence points to some sort of disagreement about the drug
sale, rather than defendant's claim that it was about Ms.
Hernandez' new boyfriend.

Even if the argument was about the new boyfriend and
defendant's refusal to leave the apartment, it is unlikely that a
jury would find that this created an extreme emotional
disturbance that was reasonably explained or justified.

This is

especially true since defendant claimed at trial that he was so
upset he did not know what he was doing and could not recall the
stabbing but had told inconsistent stories to police officers.
First he denied any knowledge of the stabbing, whatsoever.

He

also said that he believed Chito stabbed her and that he was in
Idaho looking for Chito because of her death.

Then he said that

Ms. Hernandez accidentally stabbed herself and that he mercifully
finished her off.

Having heard these stories, it is unlikely

that the jury believed that defendant could not recall stabbing
Ms. Hernandez or strangling Roberto or that defendant was under
the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance.
It is also unlikely that they thought the disturbance
was reasonably explained or justified by ingestion of drugs and
alcohol or by an ethnic reaction to the term "mother-fucker" or
to being told that Ms. Hernandez had a new boyfriend, or by any
combination of these things.

For these reasons, defendant was

not prejudiced by the prosecutor's inaccurate remarks and
defendant's convictions should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to affirm defendant's convictions.
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